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GENERATIONAL TRANSITION IN FAMILY BUSINESS 
AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF CAPITALS IN SOCIAL 
REPRODUCTION STRATEGIES
Abstract
The paper presents the results of research into the problem of succession in 
family business in the broader perspective of social reproduction strategies. 
based on Pierre bourdieu’s theoretical habitus-field framework and strate-
gies of reconversion of capitals, it identifies preconditions for successful 
succession, the strategies of reconversion applied and the structure of capital 
transfers along with transgenerational change. The author recognizes habitus 
as the pivot element of explanation, the specific adequacy of capital structure, 
individual preferences and aspirations with situational potential, and general 
structural rules. 
Keywords: succession, family business, reproduction, habitus, economic 
capital, cultural capital
INTRODUCTION
Family businesses are important market actors, responsible for a substantial share 
of GDP production and a vast percentage of employment in most capitalist econo-
mies [morck et al. 2000; Neuberg, Lank 1998]. They are usually thought of as 
small and medium enterprises; nevertheless, they represent from over 30% up to 
even 45% of the Fortune 500 [aronoff et al. 1996; Villalonga, amit 2006; 2009; 
shleifer, Vishny 1986] and one third of the s&P 500 [anderson, reeb 2003]. 
such facts demand more scientific attention.
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The growing body of research and publications in the area of family business 
has been dominated by questions of succession [benavides-Velasco et al. 2013]. 
This is not surprising, considering that succession is the biggest challenge for the 
continuity of a family business while succession within a family plays a central 
role in maintaining its character. most of the research on transgenerational suc-
cession in family business is conducted within management studies, assuming 
the institutional economy approach. However, fragmented results and the lack of 
any general theory of generational transition lead to some major questions about 
the limits of the disciplines’ outlook [sharma et al. 1997: 7]. some authors point 
out that theorems adopted in succession research fail to meet specific theoretical 
requirements and can therefore be recognised merely as fancy etiquettes or de-
scriptive terms of an interesting phenomenon [Giambatista et al. 2005]. Leaving 
aside the question of the necessity of a general succession theory, one can point 
to the problem of deficits of general knowledge of transgenerational succession, 
in particular, its economic and social consequences, modes of inheritance of 
companies and assets, as well as historical continuity [safin et al. 2014: 50]. That 
would explain why researchers introduce such variables as values, interpersonal 
communication, family culture and bonds into the management-study perspective 
[Dunemann, barrett 2004]. adapting learning, life cycle or game theories as well 
as some psychological concepts is common and directly postulated by some of 
the researchers in this field [sharma et al. 2004].
as generational transition in family business becomes more and more inter- 
or multidisciplinary, there is also a place for important contributions regarded 
from the sociological perspective. an important example of combined socio-
logical and economic research was delivered by krzysztof safin, Jacek Pluta 
and barbara Pabjan [2014], who adopted Peter blau’s social exchange theory to 
model generational transition, in terms of integration and opposition, as well as 
the institutionalisation of the exchange process. such an adaptation resulted in 
some valuable findings; however, a general theoretical comment is also required. 
The selection of blau’s theory seems justified since a more extensive economi-
cal and utilitarian perspective of human behaviour was adopted. However, it 
simultaneously shifts the focus of such a theoretical approach to the reciprocal 
exchange of benefits and it limits behavioural motivation to the expected returns. 
consequently, it offers less of a sociological perspective of the whole generational 
transition problem than one might expect, as the authors missed some important 
sociological aspects of social structure and hierarchisation.
Taking the subordination of sociological considerations to managerial studies 
and the institutional economy as a weakness of such analysis, one could reason-
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ably ask about an alternative. This may be found in a change of approach, to look 
at succession processes not as part of a wider perspective of business transfer but 
to adapt the sociological perspective in the first place, which would allow for the 
recognition of individual dilemmas and choices in a wider context of structural 
settings and limitations [mills 1959]. This would appear to be an important con-
tribution because, so far, family businesses have never received the sociological 
attention they deserve [Lajstet, królicka 2017: 56–57]. such a perspective may 
be found in adapting the theory by Pierre bourdieu, redefining succession in 
terms of class reproduction strategies. in other words, such a theoretical approach 
shifts the perspective from business and enterprise to the practice of social rela-
tions and the structure of possessed capitals. The analysis of succession viewed 
as reproduction has to take into consideration several aspects that comprise the 
social structure and the structure of the field in which entrepreneurs are set.
THE EVOLUTION OF THE ECONOMIC FIELD  
AND THE (RE)BIRTH OF THE PROPERTY CLASS 
The reconstruction of capitalist relationships and the emergence of the entrepre-
neurial class after 1989 fits into the narrative of the return to the development 
tracks of mid-war Poland from which it was derailed by world war ii and the 
subsequent communist era [bucholc 2012: 14]. Despite the wishful character 
of collective ideas about the golden era of the entrepreneurs, deconstructed 
by marta bucholc, the idea of ruptured continuity is at the roots of the widely 
shared concept of the rebirth of the entrepreneurial class and the creation of 
capitalism without capitalists [eyal, szelenyi, Townsley 1998]. in Poland, the 
rebirth is predominantly associated with the so-called wilczek’s law1, which 
aimed at liberating the entrepreneurial spirit of Poles, hitherto suppressed under 
the centrally controlled economy, also appearing as a cornerstone of liberal, pro-
market reforms. This well-known picture turns more complicated if one asks 
why wilczek’s law was actually possible. bourdieu’s habitus-field concept may 
provide a deeper insight into the process. “a field in bourdieu’s sense is a social 
arena within which struggles or manoeuvres take place over specific resources 
or stakes and access to them” [Jenkins 1992: 52]. reference to the concept of the 
field allows for a description of economic activities within a centrally planned 
economy without any market concept being pinpointed, i.e., access to restricted 
goods within the shortage economy as a certain position within the economic field, 
1 The economic activity act of 23rd December 1988, commonly known as wilczek’s law. 
158 Łukasz Trembaczowski
allowing for the reconfiguration of such goods to other forms of economic capital 
(material and financial) as well as into symbolic capital. replacing the market 
concept with that of the economic field does not draw the researcher’s attention 
to the rupture between the centrally planned economy and the market system, but 
instead allows for the concept of gradual reconfigurations of the economic field. 
according to Jenkins, reconstruction of a field requires three distinct operations: 
the relationship of the economic field to the field of power must be discussed, 
the reconfigurations of the structure of the field’s position due to clashes within 
the field over dominance must be described, and habituses of agents within the 
economic field must be analysed [Jenkins 1992: 53].
The relationship of the economic field towards the field of power can be 
described in terms of an autonomisation process. The enforcement of the com-
munist regime led to the development of another type of capital, political capital 
[bourdieu 1998: 16], and the heteronomous principle of hierarchisation that 
contained the economic field within the field of power. However, the periodical 
reappearance of political fractures and economic crises resulted in the growing 
autonomy of the economic field [Gardawski 2001]. such autonomy was gained 
within the administrative class (known as the “party nomenklatura”) over the 
dominant principles of hierarchisation [Domański 2015: 90–93]. while the tech-
nocratic party elite gained more and more influence [Gardawski 2013: 57], one 
could observe the development of heterodoxy of the primacy of the economy 
over politics. The economic field, contained within the field of power, while 
possessing autonomy with respect of it, started heading towards total autonomy 
from the field of power. The autonomous principle of hierarchisation within the 
economic field was thus the nucleus of the logic of the field during the transfor-
mation era that reigned unchallenged when the economical field achieved total 
autonomy with respect to the laws of the politics.2 in other words, wilczek’s law 
was only a consequence of earlier changes and a catalyst for ongoing processes. 
such general changes of the field created space for the (re)birth of the property 
class after 1989. 
The birth of the property class must be discussed in consideration of the modal 
trajectories of access to the economic field and the rising position of the entre-
preneur. 
2 whether it gained such an autonomy is a different issue. even now, control of the state over 
some sectors of the economy (i.e. mining or power generation) and the relative weakness of the 
employers’ organisations (such as business centre club or Lewiatan) together with their limited 
political influence [Jasiecki 2002: 239–248] raise questions about the scope of economic field’s 
autonomy or even a halt/reverse in the process of autonomisation.
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The first trajectory would appear to be the reconversion of the political capital 
(undergoing rapid inflation at the turning point of the transformation process) into 
economic capital. such a trajectory corresponds to the concept of gaining property 
rights by nomenklatura, developed in the literature on the topic [staniszkis 1990; 
wasilewski 1995]. Leaving aside discussions of the scale of the phenomenon, the 
scope of such reconversion is worth considering. in terms of the middle strata of 
the administrative class, the privatisation included the acquisition of some assets 
of state-owned companies (and the most valuable workers). Gardawski calls it 
the acquisition of hardware [Gardawski 2013: 63].
The second trajectory would be the reconversion of cultural capital, both 
incorporated and institutionalised, into economic capital. one can recall here 
the concept of “privatisation of software”, understood as taking over contracts 
and know-how of state-owned companies which were cornerstones of the busi-
nesses started up by former executives and employees of state-owned companies 
[Gardawski 2013: 63]. This trajectory was also followed by entrepreneurs outside 
the former nomenklatura. These people were graduates of technical universities 
with a certain level of expertise, although they had little or no political capital 
to reconvert. However, they possessed enough cultural capital, i.e., relevant 
knowledge, to start their own enterprises in favourable conditions. 
The third trajectory would be the reconfiguration of the economic capital 
gathered either through quasi-legal/illegal ways (i.e. contraband or commercial 
tourism) or earned abroad (joint-venture companies). such investments were 
necessary because those relatively small amounts of capital allowed for long-term 
profits unavailable in any other way. Depending on the amount of such assets, 
they allowed people either to start their own businesses or to acquire unfinished 
privatisations of state-owned companies.
agents that entered the economic field and took the role of entrepreneurs 
brought in different capitals which had to be converted into economic capital 
and different habituses formed in other fields with other logics. moreover, in the 
beginning, the transformation process led to anomie, and the logic of the economic 
field was far from transparent or fully fledged. in fact, the rules of the field were 
worked out by agents operating in that field during acts of mutual cooperation, 
competition, exchanges of blows or favours. it was the founding generation of the 
property class that contributed to the creation of the logic of the economic field. 
However, when reconfiguring the economic field, entrepreneurs developed new 
habituses that fitted the field’s logic. Now, as the founding generation is going to 
transfer their enterprises into the hands of a younger generation, the problem of 
class reproduction appears to be central. 
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THE QUALITATIVE STUDY – METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
The results discussed in this paper are based on research conducted by the author 
in 2016 and 2017. The main focus of the research was on perceiving succession 
as a reproduction strategy of the property classes, formulating several research 
questions:
 – why was succession adopted as a strategy of class position reproduction?
 – what conditions must be satisfied for succession to become a successful 
reproduction strategy?
 – what other strategies, other than succession, were considered and why 
were they abandoned?
 – what is the structure of capitals transfers from one generation to another?
 – what investments did the senior generation make to prepare for succession?
 – was the cultural capital deficit made up for in educational investments? 
The main approach of the research was based on an attempt to overcome 
business owners’ perspective bias that was repeated in earlier studies [surdej, 
wach 2010; safin et al. 2014, Pawlak 2014]. since intergenerational succession 
in family business involves two main actors, the doyen3 and the successor, they 
deserve the same attention, as the succession perspective can differ substantially, 
depending on the role played by the actors throughout the analysed process 
[safin et al. 2014: 197]. To ensure comparability of the results gathered from the 
older and successor generations, it was assumed that interviews would be held 
with the doyens and the successors of the same family enterprise. The target 
was to interview only those companies that have already accomplished their 
transgenerational succession or are advanced in that process (a successor already 
held an executive position in the company). 
The research comprised in-depth interviews with the original owners and 
successors of twelve family businesses from five voivodships. This resulted in 
twenty-six registered interviews. Together, it gave thirteen interviews with doy-
ens (one female and twelve males) and the same number of interviews with the 
successors (two females and eleven males)4. seven of the successors were aged 
from 21 to 30, four were in the range between 31 and 40, and two were over 40. 
in the group of doyens, most (seven) were between 61 and 70 years, four were 
younger (51 to 60 years), and two were over 70 years old. 
since there is no generalised database concerning family businesses available 
in Poland, and even estimations of their general population depend on an adopted 
3 in the article, the term “doyen” is used to describe owners from older generation. 
4 in one company, two interviews were carried out with the doyens and two interviews with 
the successors.
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definition [safin 2007: 46–57], no representativeness criteria were adopted. The 
earlier research, especially that of a quantitative character, proved the insignificance 
of the sector in which a company operates [suredej, wach 2010] or the regional 
differences of such succession processes [safin et al. 2014: 193]. consequently, 
neither sector nor region of registration was taken into account while selecting 
respondents. even though sector can differentiate the family business conditions, 
like experienced risks [Trembaczowski 2016], market position, networks of 
cooperation and other factors, the sector was not adopted as a sampling criterion, 
but it was referred to in the analysis.5 at the beginning of the research, the size of 
the family business was taken as the main differentiating variable (with reference to 
the distinction between businessman and craftsman [Gardawski 2013]). because of 
the difficulties in reaching the respondents, the best option seemed to be snowball 
sampling. This assumption was soon verified in practice, because the respondents 
were somewhat reluctant to provide contacts to other business families which had 
also undergone succession or avoided the promise to contact the researcher with 
such families. Following the steps of the earlier research carried out in Poland, the 
author cooperated with the Family business institute and the Family enterprise 
initiative to select respondents ready to take part in the research. eventually, 
purposive sampling was adopted. all the interviewed companies originated from 
the sme sector, and four companies were chosen in each size category: micro 
(1–9 employees), small (10–49 employees) and medium (50–249 employees). The 
in-depth interviews were based on similar lists of questions, and most topics were 
raised in interviews with both the doyens and their successors. However, some 
questions, like those about the company history, were asked only to the founders. 
The doyen and the successor were interviewed separately. 
carrying out the research proved to be very difficult, not only because of 
the general reluctance of family businesses to take part in the research, but also 
because of the adopted criteria and subject of the research. Firstly, the topic 
of succession overlaps areas of family life, wealth or business strategy, none of 
which business families tend to discuss. secondly, the insistence on interviewing 
respondents from both generations, founding and succeeding, resulted in many 
refusals (it proved hard to convince respondents from both generations). Third, 
to avoid the family members agreeing on answers, the interviews were conducted 
consecutively, and the presence of both the respondents in the company at the 
same time proved to be an obstacle. all these difficulties impeded the research 
and extended the data gathering period.
5 The sector of operation appeared to be important in the case of entry barriers to the sector 
or consolidation processes but was not further specified in this paper.
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The discussed research constitutes a part of a larger study that hopefully will 
allow for a deeper and broader analysis of the succession problem. However, the 
data gathered so far allowed us to verify some assumptions and shed light on 
the process of succession considered in a wider social context of class position 
reproduction. since there had been no research comparing the doyens’ and their 
successors’ perspective on succession in family businesses conducted in Poland, or 
the participation of owners and successors was marginal and the qualitative study 
was only of an auxiliary character, it seems justified to publish the preliminary 
results [Lewandowska 2014].
SUCCESSION AND INHERITANCE – TWO PERSPECTIVES  
OF REPRODUCTION
The research concept presented in this paper shifts the interest from simple 
generational changes within the company to the wider perspective of social 
reproduction strategies. with such an approach, focusing only on the company 
would be misleading. To overcome the enterprise perspective bias, the question 
asked by krzysztof safin was particularly important: who should inherit, and 
what? [2014:51] indeed, this question is the problem that all the parents face, 
especially if they have more than one child. business families are no exception 
here; however, the question is more complicated. it appeared during the research 
that the doyens consider succession within a family business as part of a wider 
process of inheritance, and answers to questions about the successor were al-
ways given within a wider family wealth context. one of the respondents put it 
straightforwardly:
I want my son and my daughter to enter the company by the end of the year. I don’t 
know how big the share would be […] I would just like as the saying goes “to pay 
them off” [the other two children who do not inherit company]. Me, not them. Not 
those [children] who will enter the company. […] I want to do it. (Doyen 1_1) 
economic capital is central to the property class positions and no wonder; 
this very capital is considered mostly when the doyens think of providing for 
their children’s future. in other words, limiting succession only to the enterprise 
is inappropriate, because in the doyens’ experience, the question is about the 
children inheriting the family wealth and the family enterprise is only one of the 
assets. Parents, at least at the declarative level, tend to divide, as krzysztof safin 
calls it, “succession mass” equally between children. Passing on a company to 
an heir, specific transfer schemes – especially regarding economic capital – are 
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required which take into consideration other children who do not inherit part 
of the company, so as to make the transfer just. This can take different forms, 
like funding the building of a house, passing on an old building that used to be 
the headquarters or transferring start-up capital to newly established companies 
of the children that do not inherit the family business (all examples taken from 
interviews). such an outlook can be noticed in statements of both the doyens and 
the successors. as one of the latter put it:
There was a major management problem in the company and as some of the assets 
were indivisible, we had to straighten things out. (successor 7)
striving to support children in the future, an expression that the doyens very 
often stated during interviews also referred to children from other relationships. 
one of the respondents declared that he had separated part of the company’s as-
sets (that can function as an independent enterprise) for his son from a previous 
relationship. it is worth mentioning that his company was started with his second 
wife, and their two sons are the successors. in other words, balancing the inherited 
assets is one of the key factors taken into consideration in the succession process. 
even if the company is to be run by siblings who found their niches or specialisa-
tions, parents have to face the question of balance. one of the successors revealed 
that she nearly resigned from her leading role in the company when her parents 
insisted on transferring shares to the third sister who was already running her own 
business. The balance of just shares, as the parents see it, must therefore meet 
with the successors’ view of the matter. in such conflict situations, successors that 
took the leading role refused to work together with all the siblings (in all cases, 
the maximum number of successors engaged in the company was two, despite 
the actual number of children). The argumentation was based on the dispropor-
tion between the work done by those who are involved in the company and the 
distribution of profits. in fact, all conflicts recorded in the interviews between 
siblings regarding succession concerned the work-ownership overlap. while 
successors stressed that work and ownership should be connected, and they did 
not accept sibling shareholders who did not contribute to the company’s opera-
tions, it was hard to get the opinions of the founders, as they were very reluctant 
to discuss any conflicts between the siblings, choosing instead to talk about the 
harmony that was eventually achieved.
The shift of attention from company to family relationships adapted in the 
research revealed an alternative outlook of the doyens’ heirdom strategy compared 
to the typology of strategies for the relationship between the company and the 
family. even though all such strategies adapted in the interviewed companies 
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can be merely reduced to two types, “company from generation to generation” 
and “co-ownership of the family with the management of one family member” 
[sułkowski, marjański 2009: 160], they take place within wider family inheritance 
and social position reproduction strategies. This appears visible when the “left 
out” children are considered; they are usually marginalised in analysis of the 
relationships between the family and the company. 
The problem of strategies adapted for and by children who do not inherit 
a company reveal how the succession alternatives were valued by the doyens. 
it also reveals what real strategies were adapted to reconfigure the capitals so as 
to keep the social position gained by the parents’ generation. issues of pride or 
reluctance to share such information can be accepted as an indicator of the value 
assigned to different strategies. a “normal” alternative to succession would be 
running one’s own enterprise, with or without the help of the parents. Quite often, 
it is the only strategy that the doyens took into consideration when starting another 
business only for the purpose of passing it on to a second child. one successor 
revealed how obvious such a solution is: 
My father [established another enterprise for my sister] because we knew no other 
option to do it any other way. (successor 3)
For the founders, it was obvious that the children who were left out of the 
succession would start their own businesses as a reproduction strategy. when 
asked about it in the interviews, it was common for the founders to say, “of course 
he has his own business”. in other words, a modal strategy for children left out 
of the succession was to reproduce their position within the dominant class (with 
high levels of economical capital, and relatively lower of cultural one) with the use 
of economic capital, transferred from the older generation, therefore allowing the 
children to (re)enter the field by establishing their own business. with reference to 
the distinction between the “programmed” and “seeking” biographies developed 
by Hanna Palska [2002: 99–104], one can categorise the described reproduction 
strategies as “programmed” or “family made”. 
reconfiguration strategies directed outside the richest in the economic capital 
fraction of the dominant class to its fraction with the higher levels of the cultural 
capital, like professionals or academics [bourdieu 1984], were relatively rare 
(only three cases). both parents and siblings were proud of those family mem-
bers who had entered that pathway, and they valued their educational successes 
highly. such a reconversion of economic capital into cultural capital allowed to 
make up for the family’s cultural capital deficit (a nouveau riche syndrome) and 
legitimised somehow the gained position. However such cases did not change 
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the inclination to the main reconversion strategy. The best example of such an 
attitude was the case of the son left out in the succession who was finishing his 
medical studies. both interviewees, father and son (who inherited the company), 
declared independently of each other, that they expect he (the son left out during 
succession) would run his own medical clinic and they were going to help him 
to start up. For them ownership of own business was the measure of their son’s/
brother’s future success, not the profession he was to perform. The intergenera-
tional movement between class fractions follows the hierarchisation principle 
of the field, and allows for the anticipation of a relatively high proportion in the 
second generation of members of the possessing fractions who originated from 
the same fraction [bourdieu 1984:120]. 
SUCCESSION IN A FAMILY BUSINESS AS A TRAJECTORY  
OF THE RECONFIGURATION OF CAPITALS
any direct discussion of succession needs the context of alternative reproduction 
strategies. alternative pathways of capital reconversion and reproduction strate-
gies can be traced in those successors who did not enter the family enterprise 
directly, but who nevertheless showed different professional experiences and 
returned to the family business when reconversion attempts failed. Those cases 
transcend the distinction between “seeking” and “programmed” biographies 
(Palska 2002), because they merge individual attempts to construct their own 
independent career with “family made” dispositions. what should be added here is 
the fact that real attempts to work outside the company were observed only in the 
case of deep labour markets (in more industrialised and urbanised areas) while in 
shallow ones (less urbanised and industrialised) they tended to end up as merely 
intentions [kozek 1993: 56]6. Therefore, real attempts prove more important as 
they reveal different strategies, which usually end in failure. 
one of the successors had taken several jobs, mostly of a subordinate cha-
racter, and he described his experience in a very blunt way:
I had my ass kicked so hard, I haven’t been afraid of any job since then. (successor 5)
even though he eventually held a better position in low-level management, his 
decision to return was based on evaluating the capitals he had and the achieved 
position relative to the rising trajectory he expected within the family business. 
similarly, a more successful respondent, who was developing his corporate 
career, eventually abandoned it after he missed a promotion. That is especially in-
6 The classification of labour markets was done with the help of an expert. 
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teresting in the face of declarations made by the entrepreneur’s children who point 
to corporations as preferred career pathways [Lewandowska, Tylczyński 2014]. 
The successor’s father stated that he had failed due to a lack of connections 
or relationships necessary for upward promotion. although deficits in social 
capital and failure to be promoted played a role, the successor pointed to a habitus 
mismatch in his declaration about leaving the corporation:
For the entrepreneur’s son, there is no chance in a corporation: influence on deci-
sions – none, speed of decision making – none. I saw no connection between what 
I was doing and the effects – it made no sense. […] I could have done things that 
would have increased sales except I couldn’t because I had to do some stupid things. 
(successor 6) 
successors who returned to the family businesses did not consider it a failure 
but a sound choice. Decisions were based on their calculations, because they 
found out that the relative position in the family enterprise they could reach after 
their return was relatively higher than what they had already achieved and, as 
one successor stated: 
it would require years to achieve that in a corporation. (successor 6) 
a similar motivation is behind decisions made by successors who had never 
attempted to have a professional career outside the company. That was most often 
associated with difficulties in finding a position after graduation, a motivation also 
declared by those who really wanted to run the family business: 
when we graduated, it was hard to get any job […] so why look around for a job 
when you can find one in your own backyard? (successor 10) 
successors who had never attempted any career outside the family enterprise 
and, according to their declarations, had come to the family business only temporar-
ily, eventually got caught up in its affairs. The opportunity to work independently 
and in a position relatively higher than what they could have achieved somewhere 
else, revised their attitudes: 
I have more and more respect for my father, […] Before, I thought of it as a small 
shitty business with just a few employees, but when I saw how it worked, and what 
we had to cope with to survive […] and how much there was for me to do […] I de-
cided to stay. (successor 12)
The element that usually was the catalyst for the return to the family business 
was marriage. Nearly all respondents who decided to give up their initial plans 
and careers did so when they needed more stabilisation, and this was associated 
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with marriage. such a return to a safe haven is not only associated with a secure 
position guaranteed by the status of being the owners’ son or daughter but predomi-
nantly with the competencies they had gained throughout the years of helping/
working in the family company before the actual process of succession begins:
Eventually, you ask yourself, what else you can do? (successor 10)
most valid answers came from those successors who had never considered 
leaving the family business and were committed to working there. The successors 
often repeated: 
I always knew […] I would run the family business. (successor 2) 
succession, in such cases, was treated as obvious because indeed:
it was natural (successor 10) 
and 
that’s how it turned out. (successor 7) 
ironically, the usually – but not always – very smooth successions were most 
difficult to analyse because they were described as if there was no agency of the 
successor or the doyen. since practice is “intrinsically defined by its tempo” 
[bourdieu 1977: 8], the key to understanding such a situation is to be found at 
a point earlier than the succession process itself. Nearly all of the successors 
recalled their childhood, when the company used to be their playground and 
“helping in the company” – another keyword used by both parents and successors 
to describe the successor’s work, even after they were employed on a full-time 
basis – was inseparable from other housework, like dusting, washing dishes or 
mowing the lawn. This is echoed in the successors’ notion of “our company”, 
no matter whether they were speaking about their childhood days or the present. 
This extended family home was a place where they were engaged in most of the 
simple tasks, like sweeping the floor or weighing and labelling commodities, 
through more advanced ones like operating a conveyor belt or helping in vehicle 
repairs, to even taking control of the company when their parents went on holiday. 
No wonder it was difficult for the interviewees to pinpoint the exact moment the 
succession started or decisions were made, because they were inscribed in their 
daily practice. bourdieu does not “accept that practice can be understood solely 
in terms of individual decision-making on the one hand, or as determined by 
supra-individual ‘structures’ as the metaphysics of objectivism would have it, on 
the other” [Jenkins 1992:45]. The bridging concept of habitus is what needs to 
be recalled in order to explain succession as a process steeped in social practice, 
despite the decision-making and external conditions. The latter are important, but 
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habitus becomes essential to understand smooth successions because “it ensures 
the active presence of past experiences, which, deposited in each organism in 
the form of schemes of perception, thought and action, tend to guarantee the 
‘correctness’ of practices and their constancy over time, more reliably than all 
formal rules and explicit norms” [bourdieu 1990:54].
The formation of habitus begins at the very beginning of life. The doyens 
often spoke of their children’s natural curiosity and the will to be involved in 
family affairs, which only needed not to be suppressed. The creation of the 
entrepreneurial habitus, reflecting direct and indirect choices, decisions and 
dispositions, would be the central notion to explain why one’s own company, 
either inherited or established by oneself, is such a predominant career path. The 
disposition to work on one’s own is found in a statement that can represent many 
similar answers given by the respondents: 
I am the kind of man who doesn’t like to work for others. (successor 4) 
This can explain why some reject profitable jobs abroad to run their small 
business which offers them 
much more satisfaction than any other job (successor 7)
or abandon a career as a therapist to discover that working in a family 
enterprise is 
the job of their dreams. (successor 12) 
in some very special moments, when festive or official narratives are 
abandoned, and respondents reflexively analyse their life, the habitus dispositions 
are almost tangible. explaining his educational choices (managerial studies for 
someone who decided to be a tour operator) and finding that the reason for doing 
so was simply rationalisation, one respondent explained that such 
things happen at the level of instinct. Instinct doesn’t tell me, but rather it’s done. 
(successor 5) 
such “unexplained coincidences” happened to all respondents who found, 
often to their surprise, that their education perfectly suits the needs of the 
family company. in other words, it is habitus that is responsible for adapting 
succession as the strategy of class reproduction, since it appears as an adaptation 
mechanism, ensuring harmony between subjective aspirations and the possibility 
of accomplishing them [Jacyno 1997: 27]; however, habitus itself is not enough 
for a successful succession. on the one hand, habitus dispositions do not exclude 
deliberation or rational decisions, while on the other hand, working for a family 
business is not only about calculating the position, remuneration and favourable 
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conditions it gives. The doyens often say that their successors don’t earn much 
(Doyen 9) and usually work more than their employees (this, however, may differ 
from case to case [więcek-Janka 2014: 46]). in other words, incompatibility 
of successors’ dispositions to “external” milieus of corporate work, allow to 
understand their higher valuation of work for one’s own over job in someone 
else’s company. 
The habitus’ dispositions do not mean that succession is deterministic pro-
cess. The situation of the company, or as krzysztof safin calls it, “succession 
potential”, does play a part and is taken under consideration.
calculating a company’s potential and capabilities to support two or three 
families is the main external condition that results in limiting succession to a maxi-
mum of two successors. This is a rational calculation for both sides, the doyen’s 
and the successor’s. The company may appear too small to provide a living for 
the parents and all the siblings’ families, but 
big enough to foster new enterprises (successor 4) 
for the left out children. 
TRANSFER OF CAPITALS
a popular tool to describe the trajectory of transfers presented in the Polish 
literature on succession in family business is the 3w model, which stands for 
knowledge, power and property (in Polish, all three words start with “w”) [bud-
ziak 2012]7. The data gathered in the interviews confirm the general framework 
of this model, with some specific features of individual companies. This model 
provides a useful basis for analysing the transfer of capitals in a business family. 
as emphasised at the beginning of the analysis, the specificity of the applied 
approach lies in the shift of focus from enterprise to relationships, where the 
transfer of capitals is central to understanding both the reproduction of positions 
and the succession itself. 
Knowledge – stands for the incorporated cultural capital. even when compa-
nies which do require specific knowledge and professional education are taken into 
consideration, cultural capital is not associated with any formal recognition, e.g., 
a university degree or the title of engineer; nor does it play any prestigious role 
(i.e. not to stand out from the other employees) but it refers to hard knowledge. 
7 However, some authors differentiate between the rise and education of a successor and the 
transfer of power and ownership, recognised as individual key problems or thresholds [sułkowski, 
marjański 2009: 39].
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in other words, with such educational investments, it is not the institutionalised 
cultural capital that is important for succession, but rather the incorporated one. 
This can, of course, comprise specific and specialist knowledge necessary in the 
area the firm operates in, but predominantly it covers knowledge about how to 
run a company. 
Transfers of such knowledge are of both a cognizant and incognizant char-
acter. Deliberate transfers of knowledge start the moment the founders decide to 
pass their company on to their heirs. During the interviews, both the doyens and 
the successors described such moments when the parent informed his potential 
successor about the details of the company’s operations that the other employees 
were unaware of, or that the successor would not know given his/her current 
formal position in the company. 
The incognizant transfer of knowledge starts much earlier and is interwoven 
in the practices of the family business. The doyens were often proud of the suc-
cessor’s early engagement and their specific knowledge or skills, which might 
be considered unique when compared to their peers’ knowledge of such things as 
ceramics or car construction. The successors often emphasised that the company 
was present all the time in the family home and the parents’ discussions revolved 
around it, so their knowledge about the company’s affairs was acquired spontane-
ously. but the main channel of knowledge transfer was through practice – working/
helping in the company. as pointed by one of the successors: 
there is no one in our company working on the plastics and aluminium lines. It was 
only me. No one here will ever stump me. (successor 5) 
The cognizant and incognizant knowledge transfers, or practical skills gath-
ered throughout the years of helping and expertise gained from formal education, 
sometimes combine to create a successor tailored to take over the company. 
an example would be one of the successors, who first played with clay used 
in company’s factory – he was firing fabulous [ceramic] dinosaurs (Doyen 4), 
then worked in the factory and learned the crafts from senior employees and 
eventually studied ceramics at the Technical university. The practical knowledge 
of materials gave him great advantages over his peers during his studies – his 
professor said she had never had a student like him – one who could feel and 
understand what clay was (senior 4). such a merge of specialist knowledge and 
practical skills won him the great respect of all the employees, because he was 
not a boss demanding an explanation of every single problem but one that could 
come up with solutions. according to the doyen’s statement, it would probably 
be impossible to find a manager who showed such a rare mix of competencies.
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Power is not specified by bourdieu as a different capital but as a function 
of the possessed capitals and recognition of them. since power and control are 
based on ownership, this would refer to the subtle intertwining of the two. How-
ever, formal power in a company is what really exceeds transfer of the whole 
property. entering a company, successors are usually recognised as heirs and 
gain a specific position (as forthcoming boss and owner) associated with liking 
and sometimes malevolence. before the whole power is transferred to the hands 
of a successor, he usually heads one of the company’s departments – which is 
recognised in the literature as an “advanced functional” phase of the succession 
process [Longenecker, schoen 2002: 61–64; sułkowski, marjański 2009: 42]. 
This time is essential to build up the social capital, both internally and externally.
building the internal social capital begins, to a certain extent, simply by being 
present in the company (the company as an extended family home). However, to 
gain more, yet limited power, successors must build their own background, a group 
of employees that recognise their leadership and later become trusted co-workers. 
The doyens sometimes stated that their successors were very harsh and demanding 
and they found it inappropriate. The change or evolution of their attitudes came 
along with the recognition of their position: after he engaged the employees in 
developing a strategy, I saw that his attitude evolved and I was assured I had 
made a good decision [transferring all power into the son’s hands]. (Doyen 3). 
The building of external social capital is connected with the heir constantly 
being exposed to clients and partners, even before the formal succession takes 
place, so as to broaden the successor’s network of contacts. one of the successors 
put it straightforwardly: 
my father wants me to attend business meetings and conferences to meet people […] 
I don’t feel like it, but I know he is right. (successor 2)
This transfer, however, is a complicated network of relationships. on the one 
hand, in the local environment, the successors discover their position changes 
from the owner’s son to the boss of the family business: 
I see that people changed their attitudes towards me, for example, in the town hall. 
(successor 5)
on the other hand, transfers of social capital are sometimes accomplished 
in a very subtle way. one of the founders described his experiences running 
a jewellery business when he was relatively young, hiring an older man for 
security. He soon found out that clients and partners thought the older man 
was his father, which gave his company an air of reliability since jewellery is 
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a somewhat conservative business. Now, having passed his company on to the 
children, he still appears on the premises to talk to older clients and partners, 
giving credibility to the whole enterprise. 
The reconversion of economic capital into social capital is more complicated, 
yet when performed by the founders, it allows the successors to enter into the 
network of contacts. The meaning of the family name is central here. The doyens 
have built some credibility (sometimes at high costs) which is associated with the 
family name, and this element is inherited most easily. in other words, the family 
name alone offers the heir a credit of trust, yet the successor’s trustworthiness 
must be confirmed by his own deeds [Hardin 2002, sztompka 1999: 70–78].
Property is, in fact, a form of economic capital. it plays a central role in 
the entrepreneur’s position, while the whole succession process should end with 
the transfer of ownership. This, however, is a most sensitive moment and every 
interviewed company has a different situation, ranging from the parent keeping 
the whole ownership, even without any explicit declaration of passing shares on 
to the children, who in fact run the business, through passing some stocks of the 
family business to the heirs with or without the controlling stake in the parent’s 
hands, to the transfer of the whole company, keeping a small, independent part 
of the business in the parent’s hands. The doyens were, in fact, rather reluctant 
to transfer the ownership rights and sometimes declared they would keep the 
controlling stake for the rest of their lives.
The reluctance to transfer ownership is, to some extent, associated with the 
control of the successor’s behaviour and of the whole enterprise: I hold 80% of the 
shares in the company. I’m the chairman of the board because I want to control 
where the company is heading (Doyen 3). Limited economic resources, together 
with limited ability to guarantee a certain level of revenues, are often the bottleneck 
of the whole process and all the conflicts recorded during the interviews were 
associated with the ownership-work relationship. as successors demand that 
their siblings work in the company if they hold the shares, they have the opposite 
expectation towards their parents. For them, it is obvious that their parents would 
be owners or retain shares, but they would rather choose independence in their 
work. The ownership-power relationship overlaps the ownership-work one which 
can be traced in the conflicts around the successors’ remuneration: 
I got 20% of the shares because I told my father: If you want me to work as a pro-
fessional manager, pay me as much as you would have to pay to a professional 
manager. (successor 3) 
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in other words, the link between work and power is established during the 
succession process. it is symptomatic that after succession occurs, the definition of 
the successors’ involvement changes from “help” to “work”, which is associated 
with certain revenues and more often with shares, since help is unpaid while work 
must be paid for. The work, however, is connected with power because 
to have power in a business is the key to controlling it – to hold it in real terms. 
(successor 4)
However, to have real power, one has to keep the ownership in one’s own 
hands. That is why in some of the interviewed families, one child received the 
controlling stack of shares and controls the company while the other just “helps”. 
CONCLUSIONS
The shift from the economic perspective on management succession in the family 
business to the sociological approach adopted in this paper places the reproduction 
of class position through succession at the core of the considerations. The concen-
tration on generational transition, referring to bourdieu’s theory, places succession 
in family businesses in the perspective of the agents’ habitus dispositions and 
the capitals they possess, as well as their practices and the choices they make. 
Focusing on the role and impact of the reconfiguration of capitals for the succes-
sion process allows us to draw several conclusions. bearing in mind the limited 
research sample size, the presented conclusions ought to be considered tentative 
and preliminary. The concluding comments can provide inspiration for further 
research and the formulation of hypotheses.
First, a wider parental perspective of inheritance may be observed, containing 
succession itself. The choice of a successor cannot be reduced to the selection of 
the best candidate but should be analysed from the wider perspective of family 
relationships. The pursuance of a fair or balanced transfer of economic assets is 
the cornerstone of succession decisions. such a fair transition is negotiated not 
only between parent and child but also between parents8, between siblings and 
between generations, and it requires general agreement to maintain family order.
secondly, the analysis of reconversion strategies applied by the children left 
out of the succession, as well as alternative paths abandoned upon returning to 
the company, allow us to suppose that running their own company is the main 
8 one interview comprised both parents (the co-owners of the company) and two of their 
children, which revealed deep discrepancies between the spouses’ outlook on the fair transfer of 
assets.
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strategy of position reproduction. This path was also considered by those who 
eventually succeeded in the succession process and are now heading their family 
business. in other words, succession fits into the modal reproduction trajectory, 
which means positioning oneself in entrepreneurial positions. That can be achieved 
within a family business or outside of it. 
Third, the decision to return to a family business can be traced both in a habi-
tus mismatch to alternative pathways and calculations of possessed capitals, as 
well as achievements compared to the position they might expect to walk into in 
the family business. such returns were accompanied by the stabilisation of the 
successor’s family life. it remains unclear to what extent such decisions were 
preceded by failures on alternative pathways, as not all of the siblings eventually 
run the family company. 
Fourth, one can enumerate the conditions which have to be satisfied if succession 
is to become a successful reproduction strategy. spanning decisions and structural 
conditions, habitus is central to understanding that circumscription and certain 
dispositions are indispensable for succession to occur. on the structural conditions’ 
side, effective succession potential must exist in the form of a functioning company 
that can sustain the incomes of the business family at a specified level. However, 
to last and flourish, that company must be recognised as one with potential. This 
turns the discussion to the issue of successor’s decision, referring to the evaluation 
of the working conditions and individual career building perspectives in the light of 
the amount of capitals held. This again goes back to some general conditions of the 
regional labour market, available alternatives, and the amount of capitals needed to 
maintain the inherited position or the potential upward trajectory. recognising all 
those conditions in the light of habitus allows the gap to be bridged, because some 
“rational” calculations of possessed capitals that make succession a sound decision 
are hidden from the agents. The practice of “helping” in the company appears to 
contribute to the creation of dispositions that are responsible for perceiving the 
whole succession process as a natural and obvious choice. 
Fifth, applying bourdieu’s theory allows us to distinguish habits as the central 
notion to describe succession in a family business. “being the product of a particu-
lar class of objective regularities, the habitus tends to generate all the ‘reasonable’, 
‘common-sense’ behaviours (and only these) which are possible within the limits 
of these regularities, and which are likely to be positively sanctioned because 
they are objectively adjusted to the logic characteristic of a particular field, whose 
objective future they anticipate” [bourdieu 1990: 55–56]. The reasonable, sound 
choice of a succession strategy is, therefore “obvious” in comparison with the 
rejected career paths that are “not for the likes of us”. Habitus combines specific 
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conditions of the field (i.e. economic capital as a requirement needed to enter the 
field) and individual preferences or aspirations (readiness to enter the field and 
become an entrepreneur). 
sixth, a structure of capitals transfers (cultural, social and economic) can be 
tentatively distinguished which, to a certain extent, overlaps the widely accepted 
3w model (knowledge, power, property). The transfer of cultural capital covers 
three main aspects: the practical skills needed in the production or the services 
offered by a company (gained mostly throughout childhood and the teenage pe-
riod), operational knowledge (incognizant knowledge from early involvement 
and cognizant transfer after formal employment in the company) and specialist 
knowledge, bringing together their own experiences and formal education. The 
transfer of social capital is associated with the transfer of power, because the 
very moment it starts, the transfer of contacts, networks, partners and clients is 
initiated. The transfer of power, only partial at the beginning (at the advanced 
functional phase) and complete after the early succession phase [Longenecker, 
schoen 2002: 61–64; sułkowski, marjański 2009: 42]), allows the internal 
and external social capital to develop. The internal social capital comprises the 
employees who recognise the successor’s leadership and tend to be his trusted 
co-workers later on, while the external social capital is built on the family name 
and the brand’s reputation. The transfer of economic capital is entangled with 
power relations, where the old rule of “power following ownership” [Drucker 
2000: 59] is confirmed. The transfer of economic capital is postponed by the 
older generation and is rarely complete. Three main forms of reconfiguration 
may be distinguished: the parent’s complete ownership with an appointed suc-
cessor, a parent’s co-ownership, usually holding the major stock of shares, and 
the transfer of the whole company to the heirs, securing their incomes in the form 
of dividends, or a cooperating, yet extraneous business. 
seventh, further analysis allowed us to suppose that the doyens’ readiness 
to transfer capitals is “symmetrical and opposite” [bourdieu 1984: 120] to the 
importance of capital in reproducing the position. The direction of transfers 
follows from the least important for the field (cultural capital) to the most 
important (economic capital). The founders had no problems sharing knowledge 
with their children and were usually pleased with the children’s interest in the 
company’s affairs. They often declared that they made an effort to stimulate such 
interest or allowed their children to follow it even at a very young age. sharing 
power was more difficult because if the transfer is made too early or too late 
(the Prince charles syndrome), it can have disastrous consequences. moreover, as 
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the doyens used to play a decision-making role, they had difficulties leaving that 
position. in some cases, they kept the deciding vote to decide on the company’s 
development. This overlaps with their reluctance to transfer the economic capital. 
Postponing the ownership transfer is connected with both their will to exercise 
control over the general direction of the business as well as the desire to consume 
profits guaranteed by the company. 
consideration of both outlooks, the doyens’ and the successors’, with reference 
to bourdieu’s theoretical approach, allows us to present the interweaving of the 
parental strive to secure the children’s future with the businessmen’s care for 
the company they created on the one hand, and the habitus dispositions, and 
reconfigurations and investments of capitals in order to reproduce the parent’s 
social position on the other. The formation of the younger generation’s habitus 
was twofold – within the family and the company, simultaneously. unlike their 
parents, the young generation possessing class’s habitus is their primary habitus. 
approaching habitus in terms of adequacy of subjective aspirations and prospect 
of realising them, one can explain succession as a modal reproduction trajectory. 
Therefore, one can transcend the “returning class” perspective [Gardawski 2001] 
to consider the class that has returned.
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Łukasz Trembaczowski
PRzEMIANA POKOLENIOWA W FIRMACH RODzINNYCH A STRUKTURA 
rozKŁADu KApiTAŁóW W STrATEgiAcH rEproDuKcyJnycH
Streszczenie
artykuł prezentuje wyniki badań poświęconych sukcesji w firmach rodzinnych rozpatrywanej 
w szerszej perspektywie strategii reprodukcji pozycji klasowych. odwołując się do teorii 
Pierre’a bourdieu a konkretnie jego koncepcji habitusu-pola i strategii rekonwersji kapitałów, 
tekst analizuje warunki zajścia sukcesji, zastosowane strategie reprodukcji oraz transfery 
poszczególnych kapitałów w trakcie zmiany pokoleniowej w firmach rodzinnych. badania 
wskazują na habitus jako kluczowy element wyjaśniający szczególną odpowiedniość struktury 
kapitałów, indywidualnych wyborów i aspiracji z potencjałem sukcesyjnym przedsiębiorstwa, 
a ogólniej strukturalnymi regułami i ograniczeniami reprodukcji. 
Słowa kluczowe: sukcesja, firmy rodzinne, reprodukcja, habitus, kapitał ekonomiczny, kapitał 
kulturowy
